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restrictive words therein, only a creditor whose goods are included in the
bulk sale to a third person can attack the sale on the ground that it was
made without the formalities required by law.13 It has been suggested that
such statutes limited to one class of creditors would be unconstitutional on
the ground of class legislation, it being an unlawful discrimination be-
tween creditors.14 The majority construction, therefore, follows the canon
of construing a statute in favor of its constitutionality. From this stand-
point, too, the court's decision in the instant case would seem to be a desir-
able interpretation of the Bulk Sales Law.
A. B. H.
TAXATION-CHAIN STORES-STATE TAX GRADUATED ACCORDING TO Nubt-
BER OF OuTLETs THROUGHOUT CouNTy-[United States].-A Louisiana
statute imposed a license tax upon "chain stores," the amount of tax
per retail outlet operated within the state being graduated according to the
total number of outlets in the chain, whether they were located within the
state or not.2 The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company challenged
the validity of the levy under the Fourteenth Amendment, contending that
the act arbitrarily discriminated against national chains in violation of the
"equal protection" clause,3 and that it attempted to tax property beyond
the jurisdiction of the state in violation of the "due process" clause.4
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a four to three decision, up-
held the constitutionality of the act.5
The extraordinary growth of chain stores within recent years has caused
many states to attempt to restrict their increase by imposing taxes which
fall more heavily upon them than upon independent retailers. The taxes
most frequently assume the form of graduated license taxes, the amount
13. For cases on this point see cases cited in 27 C. J., Fraudulent Con-
veyances (1922) 879, sec. 888. In Singletary v. Boerner-Morris Candy Co.
(1908) 129 Ky. 556, 112 S. W. 637, a proviso incorporated within the Act
was interpreted as expressly limiting the protection of the statute to goods
sold and delivered by manufacturer, wholesale merchant, or jobber. A
similar proviso in the Missouri Bulk Sales Law (R. S. Mo. (1929) sec.
3128) was so construed by the court in Joplin Supply Co. v. Smith (1914)
182 Mo. App. 212, 167 S. W. 649, as to extend protection of the statute to
all creditors of the seller.
14. McKinster v. Sager (1904) 163 Ind. 171, 72 N. E. 854, 68 L. R. A.
273, 106 Am. St. Rep. 268. See also Roberts v. Kaemmerer (1926) 220
Mo. App. 582, 287 S. W. 1057, and Joplin Supply Co. v. Smith, supra.
1. La. Acts of 1934, 251.
2. Amount of the tax ranged from $10 per store where chain consisted
of not more than ten stores to $550 per store of chain having more than
500 stores.
3. U. S. Const. Amend. XIV.
4. Ibid.
5. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean (1937) 301 U. S. 412,
57 S. Ct. 772, 81 L. ed. 735.
6. Eighteen states at the present time impose such a levy. Ala. Acts of
1935, 505; Colo. Laws of 1935, 1090; Fla. Gen. Laws (1935) ch. 16848;
Idaho Laws of 1933, ch. 113; Ind. Burns Stat. (1935) sec. 42-301; Iowa
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of the license depending upon the number of stores operated within the
state. In the case of State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson,7 the
United States Supreme Court upheld the Indiana graduated license tax
on the ground that the differences between chain and independent stores
constituted a sufficient basis for the classification adopted. In Fox v. The
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey,8 the Court, in upholding the West Virginia
tax as applied to chain gasoline stations, followed the doctrine. The Court
declared that every integrated chain is characterized by something dis-
tinctive which marks it off from independent stores and even from those
stores combining in co-operative leagues.9 In Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee' 0
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Florida statute which imposed
a graduated license tax, the amount of which increased if the stores were
located in more than one county. The Court held the classification arbi-
trary, saying that it was solely of different chains, the difference between
them consisting in no "factor having a conceivable relation to the privilege
enjoyed."" Mr. Justice Cardozo dissented, contending that the classifica-
tion should be upheld as one of local and national chains.12 The Louisiana
tax is in effect a classification of chains into local and national groups.
The court held that the classification was not arbitrary in view of the
competitive advantages's possessed by a national chain, operating 1000
stores throughout the United States, 100 of which are in Louisiana, over
an entirely local chain of 100 stores.
Code (1935) sec. 6943-gl; Ky. Carroll's Stat. (1936) sec. 4202a-13; Md.
Code (1935 supp.) 62; Mich. Comp. Stat. (Mason's 1935 supp.) sec.
9757-1; Minn. Laws of 1937 (Sp. Sess.) ch. 93; Miss. G. L. of 1936, 163;
Mont. Laws of 1937, 608 (effective Jan. 1, 1938) ; N. S. Laws of 1937, 249;
Pa. Act of 1937, No. 844; S. C. Code (1932) sec. 2556; S. D. Laws of
1937, 331; Tex. Vernon's Stat. (1936) art. ll1d (P. C.); W. Va. Laws
of 1933, sec. 975 (6) .A Tennessee statute levies tax of $3 per square foot
of floor space of each chain or branch store. (Acts of 1937, art. 2, sec. 2,
item B). The California Legislature adopted a graduated license tax
statute (Acts of 1935, 2273), but upon referendum it was rejected. Ken-
tucky, Minnesota, New Mexico, Vermont, Wisconsin, Florida and Iowa
formerly levied graduated license taxes upon gross receipts, but following
Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis (1935) 294 U. S. 550, 55 S. Ct. 525, 79
L. ed. 1054, which held the Kentucky tax unconstitutional, the Vermont,
Wisconsin, Florida, New Mexico and Iowa taxes have been held invalid.
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Harvey (1935) 107 Vt. 215, 177
Atl. 423; Ed Schuster Co. v. Henry (1935) 218 Wis. 506, 261 N. W. 20;
State ex rel. v. Simpson (Fla. 1935) 166 So. 227; Safeway Stores v. Vigil(N. Mex. 1936) 57 P. (2d) 287; Valentine v. Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Co. (1936) 299 U. S. 32, 57 S. Ct. 56, 81 L. ed. 25. The Minnesota
statute was repealed.
7. (1931) 283 U. S. 527, 51 S. Ct. 540, 75 L. ed. 1248, 73 A. L. R. 1464.
8. (1935) 294 U. S. 87, 55 S. Ct. 333, 79 L. ed. 780.
9. See 288 U. S. at 98.
10. (1933) 288 U. S. 517, 53 S. Ct. 481, 77 L. ed. 929, 85 A. L. R. 699.
11. See 288 U. S. at 534.
12. See 288 U. S. at 580.
13. Mr. Justice Roberts in the majority opinion particularly pointed out
that A & P received in 1934 from its vendors, secret rebates, allowances
and brokerage fees in an amount equal to $530 for each of the more than
18,000 A & P stores throughout the country.
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The Louisiana tax was the first of its kind to raise the question of extra-
territorial taxation. The general problem has vexed the Supreme Court
on numerous occasions, and the decisions upon its various phases are some-
what lacking in harmony.1 4 That taxation by a state of tangible property
permanently beyond its jurisdiction violates the due process clause is well-
established.1 5 Nor may a state tax a privilege granted by another state.10
A state may, however, levy a tax upon a privilege granted by it and use
as a basis of the tax, property which it could not tax directly.17 The court
has also held that the rate of taxation upon a privilege exercised within
the state may depend upon tangible property located outside the state.15
In the principal case, the court held that the tax is not one upon property
located outside of the state but upon a privilege exercised within the state
which the state may tax; and that having power to levy the tax, the rate
may be fixed "according to the existence of elements located both within
and without the state."19
It is difficult to foresee the practical consequences of this decision. 20 It
does seem highly probable, however, that states in which there is a strong
feeling against chain stores will follow the lead of Louisiana in adopting
this method of measuring the fee, with a consequent increase of the burden
upon chain organizations. B. R. W.
UNFAIR COMrPnTITION-TRADE-NAME--DISTINCTION BETWEEN DEScRIPTION
AND SECONDARY MEANING-[Federal].-Defendant adopted the name
"Shredded Wheat" as its trade-name in competition with plaintiff which
had used the name as its trade-name for fifteen years following the ex-
piration of its patent on the product and after plaintiff had built up a
secondary meaning in the name.' Held: that defendant be enjoined from
using the name "Shredded Wheat" as its trade name.2
14. For general discussion of problem see Stimson, Jurisdiction and
Power of Taxation (1933); Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax (1919) 32 Harv. L.
Rev. 587; Harper, Jurisdiction of State to Tax-Recent Developments (1930)
5 Ind. L. J. 507; Merrill, Jurisdiction to Tax-Another Word (1935) 44 Yale
L. J. 482.
15. Union Refrigerator Co. v. Kentucky (1905) 199 U. S. 194, 26 S. Ct.
36, 50 L. ed. 150, 4 Ann. Cas. 493; Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1924) secs.
92-100.
16. Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Kentucky (1903) 188 U. S. 385, 23 S. Ct.
463, 47 L. ed. 513; Frick v. Pennsylvania (1925) 268 U. S. 473, 45 S. Ct.
603, 69 L. ed. 1058, 42 A. L. R. 316.
17. Home Ins. Co. v. New York (1890) 134 U. S. 594, 10 S. Ct. 593, 33
L. ed. 1025; Plummer v. Coler (1900) 178 U. S. 115, 20 S. Ct. 829, 44
L. ed. 998; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward (1931) 282 U. S. 379, 51 S. Ct.
170, 75 L. ed. 400, 71 A. L. R. 1226.
18. Maxwell v. Bugbee (1919) 250 U. S. 525, 40 S. Ct. 2, 63 L. ed. 1124.
19. Note (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 619, 634.
20. The suggestion has been made that the rigors imposed by the tax
could perhaps be escaped by re-incorporation of local units into separate
subsidiary corporations. Id. at 637.
1. National Biscuit Co. v. Kellogg Co. (C. C. A. 3, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 150.
Plaintiff had been manufacturing "Shredded Wheat," a breakfast food,
under a patent which was obtained in 1893 and which expired in 1912.
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